Introduction: Unsettling Questions, Disquieting Stories by Kuykendall, Mae
+ 2(,1 1/,1(
Citation: 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 817 2009 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Tue Apr 19 14:50:25 2011
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
INTRODUCTION: UNSETTLING QUESTIONS,
DISQUIETING STORIES
Mae Kuykendall* & David Westbrook"
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 817
In 2007, Mae Kuykendall published "No Imagination: The Marginal
Role of Narrative in Corporate Law" as an essay in the Buffalo Law Re-
view.' Interest in the essay was strong, and so the Michigan State Law Re-
view, with Mae's assistance, convened the Business Law and Narrative
Symposium at Michigan State University on September 10-11, 2009. This
issue of the Law Review publishes papers based on symposium presenta-
tions.
As a not entirely innocent bystander, let me, David Westbrook, exer-
cise the privilege of not being the author of "No Imagination" to introduce
Professor Kuykendall's text in a way she herself cannot, and thereby to in-
troduce the problems that the Symposium addressed. (Once I'm done com-
plimenting her, Mae will be invited back onto these pages.) "No Imagina-
tion" maintains that corporation law lacks strong narratives: public stories
that situate the corporation in the web of contemporary legal, economic-
and most broadly-social contexts. Corporation law thus fails to achieve
what might be thought, if perhaps with a determined naivet6, to be the basic
requirement of law in any republic; that is, to explain matters of social im-
portance in publicly cognizable fashion. We all know that corporation law
matters-is a res publica par excellence. But we mandarins entrusted with
training the next generation of corporate lawyers, and who claim to be scho-
lars of the area, and who sometimes even have the temerity to suggest how
corporate matters ought to be handled by people with power over such af-
fairs, do not do a very good job of articulating what corporate law actually
means, how the law matters to everyone. We play our cards rather close to
the vest. Of course it would be impolite to suggest that we do not know.
Kafka the lawyer springs to mind.2
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law.
** Floyd H. & Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar, Professor of Law, University at
Buffalo, State University of New York. My thanks to the Michigan State Law Review and to
Mae for organizing all of this, and for inviting me to play in the sandbox. All infelicities are
to be attributed to me.
1. Mae Kuykendall, No Imagination: The Marginal Role ofNarrative in Corporate
Law, 55 BUFF. L. REv. 537 (2007).
2. David A. Westbrook, Triptych: Three Meditations on How Law Rules After
Globalization, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 337, 376 (2003) (noting that Kafka, a lawyer,
used images treating formality as the only available reality).
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Having failed to fulfill our obligations to the republic, those of us who
both teach business associations and foolishly read more deeply into Mae's
essay discover that matters only get worse. Although popular culture might
make a celebrity out of a business titan, rivaling even the fame and infamy
usually reserved for athletes and actors, corporation law, as an academic and
professional discourse, has "rigorously" confined itself to interactions
among sexless rational actors (we may no longer write "businessmen" in
law reviews), who may or may not be engaged in regulatory arbitrage as
they did or did not incorporate in Delaware, or perhaps organized them-
selves as LLCs. The fact that corporations, or business associations more
generally,' are central to American life as lived, and especially as globa-
lized, matters not at all to the field. Barely clothed in Mae's essay is the
assertion that corporate law scholars are wasting their time on a project so
abstracted as to be intellectually sterile-empty girders indeed!' Not only
are we a dead weight upon the back of the body politic, we're not even in-
tellectually amusing.'
Mae is too modest to say so, but I can and will: this essay is important.
The odds are always long, of course, but "No Imagination" bids fair to be a
turning point for the corner of the legal academy that concerns itself with
business associations. Perhaps it is merely masochism of a refined sort, but
Mae's withering critique appears to have struck a chord among legal scho-
lars, not least the many prominent and gifted folks who journeyed to East
Lansing in September of 2009 to participate in the Business Law and Narra-
tive Symposium. The participation of so many fine scholars is also, of
course, a tribute to the widespread respect and affection for Mae among the
professoriate, something else she is too modest to say but that I am de-
lighted to report.
It should not be denied that "No Imagination" presents serious diffi-
culties, as an essay, literally an attempt, should. This is an especially good
thing for present purposes: the essay's ambiguities and generally suggestive
3. And the argument could easily be extended to not-for profits, which we barely
bother to teach in the law school curriculum.
4. For the unlikely reader who has proceeded this far without being a teacher of
business associations, the reference is to Bayless Manning's The Shareholder's Appraisal
Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962), in which Manning memorably
characterizes the state of the corporation statute: "[C]orporation law, as a field of intellectual
effort, is dead in the United States.... We have nothing left but our great empty corporation
statutes-towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing
nothing but wind." Id. at 245, n. 37.
5. Mae demurs. While there is no doubt that one form of evidence for her thesis
about the distance between narrative and corporate law (as variously characterized below)
included commentary on forms of personal and intellectual distance from the enterprise
emanating from respectable quarters, she would also remind Bert that part of the thesis was
that business produces a discourse that suits it, and those drawn to it are really good at it.
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qualities have proven to be the symposium's gains, intellectual opportuni-
ties, and jumping-off points, as this volume so nicely demonstrates.
But what do I mean by "difficulties"? Much could be and has been
said, but most basically, it is not completely clear what "No Imagination,"
or law professors generally, mean by "corporate law." A few plausible un-
derstandings, by no means entirely distinct (indeed inseparable if hardly
synonymous) seem to be on the table, and variously have been addressed by
different symposium participants. Consider the following possibilities:
* The practice of teaching business associations, i.e., the contents of
the basic course, with perhaps a bit of scholarship and fragments of
more advanced courses (accounting, bankruptcy, tax, securities) as
icing.
* The questions that structure the professional texts generated by cor-
poration law scholars, and those who wish to become scholars,
along with packs of diligent law students in the (primarily) U.S. le-
gal academy, the endless recycling of the Cary/Winter debate, dis-
cussions of shareholder voting rights, the purpose of corporations,
and the like.
* The cases and statutes of Delaware, and maybe other states, along
with the collections of publicists, notably the Model Business Cor-
poration Act.
* The work done by transactional lawyers in large and especially fi-
nancial legal practices (for which the basic course is hardly an ob-
vious introduction).
* The work actually done by large and small corporations (large and
small?) in the United States, and even the global economy.
* Regulation pertaining to corporations, including securities law, the
recent nationalization of certain aspects of corporation law, and the
willingness of the federal government to provide capital to institu-
tions deemed systemically important.
* Those aspects of life organized and lived through corporate institu-
tions, the world of Dilbert, sexual harassment, the road warrior, and
the pious dream of corporate social responsibility.
* The political economy, either national or global, implied by some or
all of the foregoing.
* The bureaucratization of contemporary life and its consequences for
whatever bureaucratization is not.
It would be a simple-minded move, if one all too common in the acad-
emy, to insist on a more "rigorous" definition for corporate law, and for that
matter, for "narrative." We could then proceed to work out the existing
relationships between the two concepts, if any. Ordinarily, law profes-
sors-who are practical sorts, to say nothing of good citizens-would prob-
8 19
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ably make some normative suggestions, and, the day's work done, move on.
Right.
Instead, I want to flag the sheer difficulty of the question that Mae has
raised: what do we mean, worse, how do we mean, when we legally
represent certain collective modes of action, that class of institutions known
as the corporation, to ourselves as a society, even using state power to en-
force such representations? The symposium participants had much to say,
which Mae and I introduce below.
One way to respond to Mae's claim that corporation law is narratively
thin, and hence puzzling at best and meaningless at worst, is to rebut it di-
rectly, by telling a story about corporation law. ("You want a narrative?
Here's a narrative, and in fact, it's a narrative you already know.") The
obvious place to find such narratives is within cases. Every case tells a sto-
ry, the story of the legal harm that is the complaint. And cases, with their
stories, are the backbone of American legal education, including corpora-
tions. Thus it might be said that corporate law in America, understood as a
professional field, is narrative from its inception.
So, in "Narrative and Truth in Judicial Opinions: Corporate Charitable
Giving Cases,"' Geoffrey Miller analyzes three well-known cases' to ex-
plore, in the corporate law setting, the role of narrative in producing law.
Each case presents a concern regarding the reliability of the adversarial sys-
tem to produce a story corresponding to underlying facts. Miller retells, to
considerable surprise and good effect for a group of legal scholars, A.P.
Smith, the story of litigation surrounding whether corporate gifts to a charity
(well, Princeton) are precluded by the idea of the business corporation as an
entity that makes money for its shareholders. In Miller's retelling, we en-
counter a story of a collusion undertaken to produce a case with no real ad-
versaries, thus contributing to business law a synthetic story in a case
brought to remove a cloud in New Jersey over corporate charter authority
and, to our symposium, a making-law story about the production of narra-
tive in the adversary process.
In "Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints and Sinners, Apostles
and Epistles,"' Lyman Johnson elaborates the familiar story of the Disney
litigation. At the obvious level, a company's directors made serious mis-
takes, but such mistakes eventually are held by the Delaware courts (in mul-
6. Geoffrey Miller, Narrative and Truth in Judicial Opinions: Corporate Charita-
ble Giving Cases, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 831 (2009).
7. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v.
Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
8. Lyman Johnson, Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints and Sinners,
Apostles and Epistles, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 847 (2009).
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tiple litigations spanning many years) not to represent a breach of the
board's duties to shareholders. But Lyman also tells a more worldly tale, in
which courts not only protect directors from shareholder suits through ex-
pansive readings of the business judgment rule, but also attempt to shame
boards into better behavior. Miller and Johnson both focus on strategies
used by courts to create an image of the corporation and invite us to con-
template how well these judicial strategies work.
The reader will have to judge whether such stories are satisfying. "No
Imagination" did not claim that corporation law was completely without
narrative, but that the narratives were inadequate, raising the question, "in-
adequate for whom?" The skill with which Miller and Johnson rescue the
embedded stories about business law is only discernible to lawyers and oth-
er adepts. Indeed, in retelling widely told tales, Miller and Johnson perforce
argue that the accounts usually received by experts are not expert enough,
under the motto "you know these cases, but what these corporate law tales
really mean is ." Stepping back, if one has to be a corporate law
professor, or a lawyer in the trenches, to follow the revised story and so to
"get" corporate law, and by extension, much of capitalism, then can it be
said that corporate law is sufficiently well articulated to be of service to its
broader publics?
Interestingly, the fact that corporate law is articulated in some fashion,
involving the telling of some narrative, however arcane, is not seriously up
for grabs. As narrative theorist Porter Abbott relates in "Law, Agency, and
Unnarratable Events," we cannot help but tell stories; telling stories is
something that humans just do. Law addresses aspects of life that are al-
ways already narrated. There is even a debate, that need not be resolved
here, over whether narrative is the exclusive way to make meaning out of
jumbled events. For present purposes it suffices to note that we in fact em-
ploy narrative all the time, and cannot imagine not narrating those con-
flicted social jumbles that concern the law. That said, our narrations have a
distressing tendency to be cartoonish, too simple minded. The interactions
of people, like other emergent phenomena, are radically difficult to model,
and so our stories are almost always significantly wrong-a well-
established problem in criminal law (Abbot's examples are from criminal
law), which doctrinally relies on accounts of the world substantially at va-
riance from that of psychology.
"Narrative" may be required, perhaps even unavoidable, if we are to
have a serious understanding of business life, and hence our commercial
society, but it is hardly assured that our common understanding will be im-
proved if only we adopt narrative approaches. (In "No Imagination" Mae
9. H. Porter Abbott, Law, Agency, and Unnarratable Events, 2009 MICH. ST. L.
REv. 875 (2009).
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insisted that she was not advocating some sort of "personal stories" ap-
proach to corporate law.) In "Essay: Literature and Business: Hostility and
Dullness,"o James Seaton notes that the antagonism between literature and
politics (bracketing certain difficulties, including political economy) goes
back at least to Plato. Moreover, the dominant literary traditions over the
last several centuries have been openly hostile to capitalism. While there
are exceptions, e.g., Willa Cather, the exceptions hardly dwell on the details
of business life. One can read a great deal of Cather without understanding
much about business." This is not to say that literature is right and business
is wrong; Seaton argues, pace Lionel Trilling, that literature is a partial dis-
course, and its claims, however beautiful, must not be taken at face value.
(It bears remembering that Plato, remembered for condemning literature,
uses a literary form, and legend has it, wanted to be a tragedian-when he
talked about lies, he knew exactly what he meant.)
In a philosophically similar vein, Donald Langevoort has for years
discussed advances in behavioral economics that cast doubt on the orthodox
understandings of corporate behavior, and might be expected to undermine
the classic tales in the chestnuts taught to every law student, and, reduced to
blackletter doctrines, tested on bar exams. In "The SEC and the Madoff
Scandal: Three Narratives in Search of a Story,"l2 Langevoort discusses a
succession of simple stories in which Bernie Madoff eludes the SEC, stories
which cannot, in the nature of things, be very accurate, but which nonethe-
less may be politically powerful. Out of these partial explanations, Lange-
voort synthesizes a far more sophisticated, and probably more accurate,
account-which is almost certainly politically irrelevant by comparison
with simple accounts that command ready consumers.
Langevoort, like several symposium participants, responds to Mae's
challenge by telling stories set in the context of the corporation, and of the
laws informing corporate activities. In such stories, neither the institution
nor corporation law in general plays the role of (anti)hero. Instead, the story
is about people who happen to be situated within corporations, subject to
corporate and related laws. So, for example, in "The Personal is Interna-
tional: Sexual Harassment Narratives and the Corporation," 3 Angel Kwo-
lek-Folland discusses different ways of understanding workplace sexual
10. James Seaton, Essay: Literature and Business: Hostility and Dullness, 2009
MICH. ST. L. REv. 885 (2009).
11. Jennifer Schuessler, Essay: Take This Job and Write It, N.Y. TIMEs, Sunday
Book Review, Mar. 11, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2010/03/14/books/review/Schuessler-t.btml (discussing the call for fiction writers to
write about work).
12. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC and the Madoff Scandal: Three Narratives in
Search ofa Story, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 899 (2009).
13. Angel Kwolek-Folland, The Personal is International: Sexual Harassment
Narratives and the Corporation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 915 (2009).
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harassment. Despite similar fact patterns, and the fact that the corporate
workplaces are often transnational in scope (or are at least understood as
"modem," i.e., on a transnational model), sexual harassment is narrated
differently in different countries, and different understandings of the offense
emerge. While the corporation is a form for organizing and wielding pow-
er, and, while sexual harassment is often said to be about power, the con-
ceptual link between corporate law and sexual harassment in the corporate
setting is weak. Harassment, a legal construct intended to check power,
happens in a setting that is also a legal construct about power, yet seems
largely a separate matter. Corporation law, in short, just doesn't seem to
matter very much.
In "Corporate Theory and the Role of Narrative,"l 4 Jeffrey Nesteruk
compares different versions of the AIG scandal. As with Langevoort and
Kwolek-Folland, a few points are clear about the role of narratives in AIG.
First, a story will be told; some kind of narrative is unavoidable. The event
is too important to pass without some explanation, some account of "how
did this happen?" Second, complex facts lend themselves to more than one
telling. Third, telling the story in one way or another tends to place the spe-
cific corporation, AIG, and the institution of the corporation itself, in a dif-
ferent light. So, for example, depending on how the company's failure is
recounted, AIG may look rapacious because that is the nature of corpora-
tions, especially ones driven by quarterly earning statements in a permissive
regulatory environment. Or AIG may look bumbling because that is the
nature of collective institutions and the human condition. Thus, in stories
like Langevoort's, Kwolek-Folland's, and Nesteruk's, narratives encourage
us to understand the corporation obliquely, much as Huckleberry Finn tells
us about the Mississippi.
In "Evil Has a New Name (and a New Narrative): Bernard Madoff,"5
Christine Hurt describes the transmutation of corporate-based stories of
malfeasance from their background location within a larger complexity in-
volving investment, corporate governance, and finance into a foreground
placement featuring simple accounts of fraud and deep evil. Prosecutors
select them for their intuitive appeal to juries, victims recite them to ready
listeners, and the popular press purveys them as horror stories. Bemie Ma-
doff becomes a salient story not because he represents a useful microcosm
of financial elites in our time, but because he triggers a contemporary anxie-
ty about impoverishment in retirement. The sideshow, she believes, has
become the main attraction.
14. Jeffrey Nesteruk, Corporate Theory and the Role of Narrative, 2009 MICH. ST.
L. REv. 933 (2009).
15. Christine Hurt, Evil Has a New Name (and a New Narrative): Bernard Madoff]
2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 947 (2009).
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Other symposium participants used exogenous narratives-stories os-
tensibly about something else-to deepen our understanding of corporation
law. For example, in "Nonprofits and Narrative: Piers Plowman, Anthony
Trollope, and Charities Law,"' Jill Horwitz discusses Piers Plowman and
the roots of nonprofit law. Horwitz argues that the understanding of charity
that animates nonprofit law has been developed in, and can be understood
through, literature. Thus, whether or not the Statute of Charitable Uses
should be understood as derived from Piers Plowman, we can understand
both the legal and the literary text better by thinking about them vis-i-vis
one another. Somewhat similarly, in "Martha Stewart and the Forbidden
Fruit: A New Story of Eve," 7 Joan Heminway uses the Biblical story of
Eve's "misappropriation" of information to illuminate Martha Stewart's
insider trading case. Such arguments suggest that, quite apart from the ana-
logical understanding of law that we are supposed to learn from the study of
cases, we might imagine an analogical understanding of corporate life-that
is, we understand life in corporations not in independent fashion (requiring
narrative articulation, a story of "the corporation"), but within a broader
web of narrative understandings.
In "Essay: Telling Stories of Shareholder Supremacy," Daniel
Greenwood makes this notion-of corporate law animated by cultural narra-
tives exogenous to the law itself-much more explicit. He argues that cor-
porate law, standing alone, cannot work. As suggested by Horwitz and
Heminway, corporate law is underdetermined (Mae's point), and therefore
requires additional content in order to function. So, for example, as a matter
of positive law, shareholders are effectively powerless. In order to invest,
shareholders have to believe, despite considerable legal evidence to the con-
trary, that they are really the owners of the company, and are therefore due
the profits of the business. By the same token, directors have to believe that
they owe duties to shareholders, and should occasionally declare a dividend
... and, cases like Disney aside, by and large this works pretty well. But as
Disney demonstrates, it is not law-rules one can get enforced in court-
that makes the shareholder-centered corporation work. Greenwood in effect
concedes the point that corporation law has little real narrative of its own,
i.e., the legal account of the corporation is simply not enough to create the
functional institutions we know as corporations. Instead of positive law
backed by judicial enforcement, Greenwood argues, corporation law in
16. Jill Horwitz, Nonprofits and Narrative: Piers Plowman, Anthony Trollope, and
Charities Law, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 989 (2009).
17. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha Stewart and the Forbidden Fruit: A New
Story ofEve, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1017 (2009).
18. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essay: Telling Stories ofShareholder Supremacy, 2009
MICH. ST. L. REv. 1049 (2009).
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practice relies on mostly tacit cultural understandings in order to generate
the consensus that such institutions require to do business.
If corporation law is only understandable within a cultural context,
then law professors should welcome-and study-the recent examinations
of finance by cultural anthropologists, such as Karen Ho, Douglas Holmes,
Bill Maurer, Annelise Riles, Gillian Tett, Caitlin Zaloom, and others." (In-
deed Frank Partnoy's first book, which in the Malinowskian tradition might
have been titled Life Among the Derivatives Traders, can be read as ama-
teur ethnography rather than, as is usual, sophisticated memoir cum ex-
pose.20) At another level, the refunctioning of the ethnographic encounter to
account for the collective imaginary through which corporations function-
toward which contributions of Horwitz, Heminway, and Greenwood
point-suggests that law, as a discipline, might reimagine its own intellec-
tual domain.2 1 Conversely, law has much to offer ethnography: nowhere
else are the commitments of a culture (ours) so forcibly if not always clearly
stated.
One should not, however, become too excited about the possibilities of
working with ethnographers to think through the culture of finance-the
legal academy has had such multidisciplinary opportunities before, with
generally disappointing results.22 As no less an eminence than Coase noted,
and the recent financial crisis conclusively demonstrated, even the most
successful such effort, the transaction-cost account of the firm, has been less
evidence-based than it might have been.23 Despite the vogue for multiple
degrees in the legal academy, lawyers have real trouble taking other discip-
lines seriously, and vice versa.
So we must try try again. From professors of English like Philippe
Carrard, we law professors might learn to attend more carefully to the con-
ventions of expression that inform our understandings of finance. In "Es-
say: When Wall Street Sighs: Narratives of the Market and Personifica-
tion,"24 Carrard analyzes the way that AP writers personify Wall Street, the
market, and individual companies. Business life may have a dearth of sus-
tained narratives, but it is positively teeming with characters. Many things,
19. See, e.g., KAREN Ho, LIQUIDATED: AN ETHNOGRAPY OF WALL STREET (2009).
20. FRANK PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O.: BLOOD IN THE WATER ON WALL STREET (1997).
21. See, e.g., DAVID A. WESTBROOK, NAVIGATORS OF THE CONTEMPORARY: WHY
ETHNOGRAPHY MATTERs (2008).
22. See JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & EMPIRICAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE 245-48 (1995).
23. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Influence, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM:
ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 73 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds.,
1993) (discussing the need for empirical work to "enlighten us about the real rather than an
imaginary world" in the study of the firm).
24. Philippe Carrard, Essay: When Wall Street Sighs: Narratives of the Market and
Personification, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1083 (2009).
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like "Wall Street," "the market," and most ubiquitously companies, which
are not people, are generally thought about and discussed as if they were.
Finance is animistic. (This point goes much deeper than Carrard takes it
here: the legal instruments at the heart of financial markets, almost all of
which are fundamentally contracts, rely on such personifications to function
at all.)
In "Narrative, Myth, and Morality in Corporate Legal Theory,"25
Thomas Joo maintains that "grand narratives"--what do we mean by, ex-
pect from, "the corporation"?-shift over time and imply entire political
economies. Should we understand our associations as a delegation of state
power, the social contract once removed? Or is the corporation itself a rep-
lication of the social contract, the voluntary creation of a legal order? Much
of the perennial argument among scholars and others over "the corporation"
can be reduced to contests over the character of these somewhat inchoate
imaginares.
By this point, however, the republican complaint against corporate law
with which we began is made with a vengeance: what is the chance for En-
lightened rationality if corporate law is a rather shadowy intellectual game
played on a hardly articulated field, its content imported from somewhere
else (but where?), its purposes obscure? As the Supreme Court has recently
reinforced in its Citizens United decision,26 such questions are not merely
intellectual. How we imagine the corporation-what role we give it in our
society-importantly structures how we conduct politics. In the absence of
a sustaining vision of the corporation, we lose some part of our collective
access to a large narrative of the nation.
Three symposium participants presumed that corporate law was con-
structed through less than enlightened processes, and examined ways
through which corporate meanings might be constructed: theater, film, and
history.
In "The Drama of Corporate Law: Narrator Between Citizen, State,
and Corporation,"27 Larry Cati Backer skillfully dissects my (Westbrook's)
introduction to corporation law, Between Citizen and State, which accepts
what strikes Mae as a noteworthy void, the fact that corporation law is radi-
cally underdetermined. But, as Backer demonstrates, that's not just a bug,
that's also a feature: the corporation is best understood as a framework for
organizing social activity. In theatrical terms, corporation law is a genre,
25. Thomas W. Joo, Narrative, Myth, and Morality in Corporate Legal Theory,
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1091 (2009).
26. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 50 (2010).
27. Larry CatA Backer, The Drama of Corporate Law: Narrator Between Citizen,
State, and Corporation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1111 (2009) (reviewing DAVID A. (BERT)
WESTBROOK, BETWEEN CITIZEN AND STATE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CORPORATION
(Boulder, CO: Paradigm Press 2007)).
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with stock characters and generally understood "rules." Specific content-
this or that deal, this or that case, and our political judgments about whether
the law is working here and now-is necessarily dependent on particulari-
ties, and often reflects social realities that are unarticulated in corporate law
strictly speaking, as virtually every participant noted in one way or another.
From a conservative stance (which Between Citizen and State suggests is
necessarily the real stance of the professoriate), this separation between
frame and content, corporate law and individual transactions, is not too
troubling. The questions that we care about rarely concern "theater" in the
abstract, but instead concern how "this play" is performed. Backer points
out how complacent this stance is: a society's adoption of a given genre
says things (not necessarily nice things) about the society. By way of illu-
stration and provocation, Backer shows how much the same questions, and
even institutional forms, that structure corporation law can be found in il-
legal organizations like the Italian Mafia and the Japanese Yakuza.
In "How Movies Created the Financial Crisis,""2 Larry Ribstein argues
that, in a media soaked world, corporation law is essentially background
information about a socially important character. Corporations matter, and
most people are at least dimly aware that they are legalistic creatures. What
corporation law is not is a socially authoritative text, for the simple reasons
that society does not know and does not care where the Model Business
Corporation Act differs from Delaware law. By extension, corporate law
scholars, or even judges, are deluding themselves if they think they are
somehow writing the signification of the corporation in our society. That
process of cultural writing happens elsewhere, Hollywood preeminently.
Hollywood, however, has its own essentially romantic narratives, in which
appealing protagonists must overcome difficulties to win comely mates and
our affections. In a tradition going back at least to Rousseau, society itself
is the obstacle to individual happiness, and the role of the artist is to oppose
(oppressive) social mores. In a commercial society, which places corpora-
tions in the role of villain, the duty of the filmmaker is to expose corporate
villainy. Hollywood thus has an almost structural suspicion of corporations.
Rather than an adequately articulated, and valued, part of a well functioning
social order, the corporation, and by extension corporation law, is slandered,
even demonized.
As an aside, one might presume that the content of corporate law,
which is after all about the structure of a business organization, might come
from economics, which is concerned with interactions among marketplace
actors. Indeed, one way to understand the success of "law and economics"
approaches to corporation law over the last decades is that economics
28. Larry E. Ribstein, How Movies Created the Financial Crisis, 2009 MICH. ST. L.
REv. 1171 (2009).
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seemed to allow legal scholars to more finely articulate-or to characterize,
to use a dramatic word-the players on the corporate stage, and hence their
supposed or desired relations. Economics promised more precise descrip-
tions, and hence more thoughtful prescriptions. Unfortunately, much of the
economics that law professors so enthusiastically adopted has proven to be
much too simple, and the question for behavioral economics is whether we
can amend our psychological imagination of corporate actors in some se-
rious way.
Unfortunately, although it would be an advance, substantial improve-
ment of our psychological understanding of business actors would hardly
resolve corporation law as such. To what extent would we ever be justified
in grounding an institutional structure on an understanding of individual
actors? To what extent could we ever hope to say, because we are like this,
our business associations must be structured in this way? More darkly, such
arguments, essentially arguments from nature, tend to provide bureaucrats
(and their apologists in the academy) with rationalizations for the exercise
of power without the bother of taking personal responsibility, so that it can
be said, anonymously of course, that "it is required by the order of things"
rather than "we have decided and the faults are ours." All of which suggests
that if legal scholars wish to engage how we as a society have made and are
making sense out of business life we should turn toward history, which is
not least the study of how power was in fact exercised, by particular people
in certain times and places.29
David Skeel provides the turn to history in a legal/business setting, the
bankruptcy court, that demands an explicit attempt to make sense out of
business life. In "Competing Narratives in Corporate Bankruptcy: Debtor in
Control vs. No Time to Spare,"30 Skeel considers the evolution of social
presumptions about firms, creditors, and the role of the law in reorganiza-
tion or resolution of insolvent operations. Bankruptcy law, Skeel argues,
requires a narrative understanding so that the different actors have some
sense of what to do in a situation that is, by definition, un-looked for if per-
haps not entirely unanticipated. Bankruptcy law sets forth scripts, or to
switch metaphors, provides charts, that can be used to navigate the institu-
tional crisis. Narrative is not everything, but it is the "vessel," in Skeel's
phrase, that allows bankruptcy proceedings to move forward.In his book
The Match King," Frank Partnoy also takes a historical approach to under-
29. For a discussion of why the reconstruction of cultural anthropology to confront
the present situation in finance and elsewhere should be significant to lawyers and others, see
generally WESTBROOK, supra note 21.
30. David A. Skeel, Jr., Competing Narratives in Corporate Bankruptcy: Debtor in
Control vs. No Time to Spare, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1187 (2009).
31. FRANK PARTNOY, THE MATCH KING: IVAR KREUGER, THE FINANCIAL GENIUS
BEHIND A CENTURY OF WALL STREET SCANDALS (2009).
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standing our markets, especially securities markets centered in New York
but tenuously committed to investments everywhere. The Match King is
about the strange and again highly relevant life of Ivar Kreuger, a financier
of the twenties and thirties who ran a confidence scheme of vast proportions
in the sovereign debt and equity markets. After his death in 1932 of a bullet
wound (still unresolved), the Kreuger scandal was a major impetus behind
the passage of the securities laws of the 1930s.
In "The Match King, Chapter 9: The Author's Cut,"3 2 Partnoy consid-
ers some of the writing, and the reasons for the writing, of his book. First,
and rather straightforwardly, Kreuger was important in financial history.
Some of the weaknesses he exploited explain much of the contemporary
structure of market regulation. Other weaknesses, for example involving
over-the-counter obligations held by banks, still exist today, in often surpri-
singly similar form. The second point, however, falls hard upon the first:
Kreuger was fairly quickly, and almost completely, forgotten, so that today,
even financially sophisticated people have no idea who he was. (Indeed,
discovering that he did not know somebody so significant within his own
field inspired Partnoy to (re)discover Kreuger.) But more than historical
ignorance is at issue here: we have entered a financial crisis with many si-
milarities to the Depression. As a society, and worse, the community of
financial market regulators, we do not appear to have learned that much
about the dangers entailed in tightly integrated financial markets. And so
forgetfulness of history does carry a real risk of condemnation to repetition.
In response, Partnoy falls back on, what else, narrative. He tells a
very intriguing story, and tells it very well. Much of Partnoy's article is
devoted to a breezy yet fairly technical discussion of rhetoric-how Partnoy
intends to make Kreuger significant, relevant, and memorable to his readers.
Nonetheless, Partnoy is driven to ask whether he can achieve his ulterior
aims. After all, this is not the first book on Kreuger. And much of finance
is-in those details where devils live-boring. It is simply hard to remem-
ber much finance. Besides, the riskier corners of financial markets tend to
be youthful games, played by people who are by selection and necessity
very bright, generally of a mathematical bent, energetic, fanatical, radically
self-centered yet deeply conformist, and sure of themselves to the point of
arrogance. Much the same could be said of leverage cycles more generally:
recent success breeds overconfidence in those too young to know anything
else, and who tend to misunderstand their good luck as mastery. (The read-
er is invited to ponder the extent to which these characterizations correlate
with gender as well as age.) Learning from experience plays a negligible
part in this world, and learning from history, erudition, is virtually un-
32. Frank Partnoy, The Match King, Chapter 9: The Author's Cut, 2009 MICH. ST.
L. REv. 1207 (2009).
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known. As Charles Kindleberger so masterfully demonstrated, finance is
repetitive to the point of ennui.
Such ennui is of course dangerous. Oscar Wilde said that "It is only
by not paying one's bills that one can hope to live in the memory of the
commercial classes." Kreuger did not pay his bills on a grand scale, and the
generation he bilked did not forget him, but their children and certainly their
children's children were more than willing to invest with Madoff. It ap-
pears that we all get the Ponzi we deserve. And we have returned to where
Mae began-corporation law, however defined, seems incapable of learning
much, for long. Business stories don't really compete all that well for a
lasting spot in our brains.
If we understand corporate law as a setting for the telling of stories, a
setting that presents itself as at least well established and perhaps even natu-
ral, then surely we law teachers have a central role to play as directors, even
if we did not write the script. The narrations that corporate law, in the class-
room, offer to students are inevitably also stories (and somewhat compli-
mentary ones) about the narrators, the teachers and their models, the judges.
Thus, as suggested above, teaching (and its analogue, parenting) are funda-
mentally conservative enterprises. And it cannot be surprising that one of
the classroom's messages is respect for the teachers as authoritative repre-
sentatives of the culture we are trying to inculcate.
To be clear: making the interests of the professoriate explicit is not de-
legitimating the professoriate. Of course we, like good parents, teach what
we feel to be important. Which raises the mystery of corporate law, on a
new, more personal, and existentially more serious, level: what do we feel
important enough to transmit? What do we know that's really worth pass-
ing on? As the symposium's papers variously demonstrate, in the moment
before lawyerly arguments begin, we could ask corporate law scholars to
consider more deeply the imaginations within law and business that render
arguments compelling and teaching needful. It is of course a provocation to
say that corporation law has no imagination-the law literally cannot func-
tion without an imagination. The question is why do we settle on this im-
agination, as opposed to some other?
Regardless of the substance of our answers, as intellectuals, with dem-
ocratic commitments, we might hope that our answers are well articulated,
that our imaginations of corporate law are available to ourselves and to oth-
ers. In that case, we might hope to use corporate law to come to better
terms with our lives in global capitalism, that is, with an incredibly alienat-
ing aspect of contemporary life. That enterprise, however, would require a
much more literary sensibility than the law of business associations has he-
retofore had. This symposium has taken quite a few steps in the right direc-
tion.
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